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There is something nearly paradoxical in writing a review in English 
on the Icelander Stefán Snævarr’s introduction to the philosophy of art. 
(Snævarr is a professor at Høgskolen in Lillehammer, the University Col-
lege of Lillehammer, Norway). Not only is his book in Norwegian, but 
Snævarr has also taken pride in not only drawing on the common and 
well-known international literature in the field, but also in including Nor-
wegian and other Nordic aestheticians in his discussion. If he had not 
done that, he remarks, he might just as well have written the book in 
English or German. 
The basis for Snævarr’s book is partly his notes for lectures on the phil-
osophy of art in Bergen in the 1990s (later held also in Lillehammer and 
Kristiansand), partly his other, more scholarly work in aesthetics, e.g. his 
PhD-thesis (in English!) Minerva and the Muses: The Place of Reason in Aes-
thetic Judgment (1999); actually, Snævarr himself is the author with most 
entries in the bibliography. This double basis has contributed to giving the 
text and the whole construction of the book a rather rambling touch.
The basic tone is a surprisingly consistent and forceful orality – surpris-
ing because the basis for the text is the written notes, not e.g. recordings of 
the actual lectures. Not only does one find phrases like “as I said in the intro-
duction” (p. 19, my italics), but also remarks like “If I understand Goodman 
correctly” (p. 169), “This reminds me of a story by an Indian author whose 
name I do not remember” (p. 200) and “What would Bourdieu have said? 
Well, he would probably have said yes” (p. 210) – and I shall refrain from 
trying to render any of Snævarr’s often not too wonderful verbal puns. 
But even though the oral style is kept through the whole book, long pass-
ages become quite heavy because of their detailed renderings of the theo-
ries of specific philosophers or faceted discussions of nuanced differences 
between theoreticians. A beginner in this field will here get a thorough 
impression of what philosophical reflection of the analytical kind looks 
like; I doubt, however, that these readers will be able to stay on around the 
curves and through the particulars. But even though it says “En kritisk in-
nføring” (“A Critical Introduction”) on the title page, Snævarr makes it clear 
in his preface that “this is not solely an introduction”, partly because it 
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contains these critical discussions, and partly because it also introduces 
some of the author’s own theories. To me this is completely in order in it-
self, but I believe that critical discussion and one’s own points of view can 
easily (or with a little effort) be integrated in an introductory work that 
insists on being introductory, i.e. sticks to a target group of readers to 
whom the topic of the book is new. 
Snævarr’s Philosophy of Art is divided into three parts. The first is a series 
of inquiries into the history of aesthetics from Plato to Nietzsche; the sec-
ond a presentation of main themes and figures of 20th century aesthetics; 
and the third one a more detailed look at four more or less current aes-
thetic questions. In principle this is a reasonable structure of an introduc-
tory work, in practice a rather uneven and inconsequential presentation, 
e.g. with a rather unclear distribution of the subject matter between the 
second and the third part – but then again: Everywhere you will find fine 
and interesting reading matter. 
The historical part is the least satisfying. Snævarr seems not to have 
taken a clear stance on which kind of history he wants to tell. He starts out 
by reminding us that the modern concept of art does not evolve before the 
beginning of the 18th century, and of course this makes the reader expect 
a narrative about the rise of this concept. But later he suggests that it is 
the development of the concept of beauty that we will follow from Plato 
to Nietzsche, i.e. to the point in time where “Beauty loses its status as the 
highest value of art” (p. 20). 
Such a storyline is however not kept up through the presentation of Pla-
to, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche that follows, joined by nearly 
insipid asides (mostly based on secondary sources) on e.g. Boileau, Baum-
garten, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Schiller, Schelling, Croce and Collingwood. 
In my view, the mixture of presentations of the various main characters 
and discussions of alternative presentations (most clearly with Noël Carroll 
on Hume) does not work – and especially not in an introductory text. And 
one must ask oneself whether Snævarr is writing history at all, or whether 
this should be taken as one of those “histories of philosophy” that treat the 
philosophers of the past as our contemporaries with whom we enter into an 
equal dialogue. At any rate, Snævarr does not tell us much about the histori-
cal context of the main characters and their theories, e.g. about what their 
background was for theorizing about art or aesthetic experience. 
What had Kant – to take him as an example – seen and heard and read 
as his basis for the few remarks he has about art in his Critique of Judg-
ment? Did Königsberg have a theatre in the latter half of the 18th century? 
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To exemplify what a Kantian “uninterested judgment” about “the pleas-
ant” can be, Snævarr chooses an example (p. 65), not from Kant himself, 
but from J. O. Urmson’s often reprinted essay “What Makes a Situation 
Aesthetic” from 1957; an example that in Urmson’s original English text 
begins in this way: “Let us . . . suppose that we observe a man in the audi-
ence at a play who is obviously beaming with delight and satisfaction”.1 
But is it that kind of experience Kant speculated about? Sitting in a the-
atre, looking at a play? I shall not claim that I know the answer, but I take 
it to be a must for a real historical discussion to consider such questions.
In the second part of the book it gets clear that Snævarr does not only 
have his background in analytical aesthetics, but that he also lets himself 
be inspired by the continental tradition. But the case is pretty much what 
I indicate here: Snævarr finds inspiring material and points of view in 
continental philosophy, but he writes like an analytical philosopher.
He starts out with Adorno, and the Adorno chapter is extended with 
some material on the Frankfurt School,	figures Herbert Marcuse and 
Walter Benjamin and a short side glance to Georg Lukács before the 
chapter concludes with a discussion of Feminism in aesthetics. The next 
chapter has Martin Heidegger as protagonist, even though it is imposs-
ible to find much aesthetics or philosophy of art in his writings; Snæ-
varr finds it first of all in the essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” (first 
version from the middle of the 1930s) where Heidegger’s main example 
is van Gogh’s painting of a couple of his own boots (which Heidegger 
mistook for belonging to a peasant women). It is characteristic of Snæ-
varr’s use of these instances of continental writing that his presentation 
gets its volume from all the ideas of other philosophers, mainly from the 
analytical tradition, of which Heidegger’s text reminds him (here e.g. 
Kuhn, Polanyi and Wittgenstein).
From here we reach the chapter on “Beardsley’s Grand Edifice”, con-
centrating on Beardsley’s concept of the work of art and his discussion of 
aesthetic judgments, and with a few concluding remarks on his criticism 
of “The Intentional Fallacy”. Then follows a chapter on the Wittgenstein 
tradition in aesthetics, where also the Bergen School is deservedly men-
tioned (Gunnar Danbolt, Kjell S. Johannessen and Tore Nordenstam), and 
one on Nelson Goodman, the	presentation of whom is not followed by 
remarks on disciples or successors, but only with the views of several 
critics. Even though I consider myself a follower of Goodman to a certain 
extent, Snævarr is probably right here: during the now 40 years since the 
publication of his Languages of Art in 1968, Goodman’s often rather ex-
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treme (but precise) nominalist and constructivist views have more often 
worked as points of departure for criticism and theoretical refinement 
than as examples for imitation. 
This second part of the book ends with a chapter on pragmatist aesthet-
ics, John Dewey and first of all Richard Shusterman, and here Snævarr 
is really on home ground with critical approval. (After Snævarr himself, 
Shusterman is the philosopher who has most entries in the bibliography.) 
Then follows the third part of the book, with chapters on single issues, 
beginning with the question whether one can define art, and if so, how. 
A grumpy reviewer would here claim that the architecture of the book 
breaks down because we have already read long discussions on this theme 
in the Beardsley chapter, and it has also been treated e.g. in connection 
with Goodman’s “When is art?”-stance. And the construction gets really 
wobbly when we see that the chapter starts with the Wittgenstein fol-
lower Morris Weitz and the notion of “family resemblance” as his answer 
to what connects the many different works and genres of art under one 
common concept.	But somehow the structure is no problem in this case!
Not surprisingly the chapter tells the story from Weitz (1956) over Ar-
thur Danto and his “Artworld” (1964) and George Dickie’s institution of art 
(1969), rounded off with Jerrold Levinson’s and Noël Carroll’s “historical 
turn” in the 1990s – except that Snævarr treats Dickie before Danto (and 
misdates Dickie’s presentation of his theory to 1974). A coherent narra-
tive that it makes good sense to tell and to discuss. 
The following chapter, about interpretation, is on the other hand far 
from coherent and pertinent. Snævarr begins with a slightly skewed intro-
duction to hermeneutics that quickly reaches Hans-Georg Gadamer. From 
there the text takes a completely superfluous and useless turn around a 
little bit of Saussure, continues with the French film semiologist Christian 
Metz, the Russian folklorist Vladimir Propp, the Lithuanian-French semi-
ologist Algirdas Julien Greimas (Snævarr writes “French-Lithuanian”), the 
French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (just turned 100, by the way!) 
and the French semiologist Roland Barthes to reach the French philos-
opher Jacques Derrida and his deconstruction. Here Snævarr seems to be 
on foreign ground: neither Propp nor Greimas is in his bibliography, the 
linguistically educated Greimas is called a literary scholar and gets his 
first name wrongly spelt, and Lévi-Strauss – with French Jewish parents 
from Alsace, and grown up in Paris – is called Belgian-French, probably 
because his father, a painter, had taken his family to Bruxelles where he 
had a job during the weeks around the birth of his son. 
Review
161
The chapter ends with a discussion of the theories within analytical 
philosophy about rationality and relativity in the interpretation of literary 
works (with a side glance to interpretation of movies). Issues concerning 
interpretation of other visual arts or of music are not mentioned.
In the chapter on the evaluation of works of art Snævarr really feels 
at home: This is the theme of his dissertation. Here the different posi-
tions get names and are discussed in a fairly exact way: Objectivism (Noël 
Carroll), Scepticism, divided into Relativism (e.g. Bernard C. Heyl) and 
Subjectivism (e.g. Alfred Ayer and Pierrre Bourdieu), and then we reach 
Rationalism, Snævarr’s own stance: judgments about works of art are not 
completely subjective, but contain an element of reason and a certain em-
pirical basis. I would probably have divided the positions differently, e.g. 
making use of the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive theo-
ries (Snævarr considers subjective theories non-cognitive, but they may of 
course also be cognitively relativist, e.g. if you claim that “‘A good work of 
art’ is a work that pleases me”). And I would have used the term sceptical 
in a more specific fashion than Snævarr does. I am tempted to say that he 
could have been much more precise in defining the various positions. 
The last chapter is about the question of whether art is autonomous, 
liberated from any kind of social, political or moral connection. Snævarr 
starts out with a discussion about the existence of a special aesthetic ex-
perience, based on Edward Bullough’s well-known essay on “Psychical 
Distance” from 1912 (and with Dickie’s criticism of the concept). It is an 
important discussion, but I do not really see the relevance in connection 
with the autonomy of art. In general I must confess that I have trouble 
taking the whole question of autonomy (and “l’art pour l’art” etc.) seri-
ously because of its essentialistic foundation. Of course art “is” nothing in 
itself, and every single person is free to decide whether she wants to focus 
on aesthetic or moral aspects of a work of art.
I imagine that Snævarr here thinks the way I do, but strangely enough 
he does not make his position clear in this chapter. He restricts himself to 
giving a series of adequate presentations of the positions of various con-
tributors to the theme and of their mutual discussions, and only at the end 
he – surprisingly – suggests an essentialistic stance. It may e.g. “be the case 
that instrumental music is close to autonomous” (p. 275), he writes; he does 
not seem to know the story of how in Italy in the middle of the 19th cen-
tury just to whistle a theme by Verdi could mean making a political state-
ment because of Verdi’s well-known political position, and because his 
name could be understood as an acronym of Vittorio Emmanuele, Re d’Italia 
(Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy). But right after this unlucky remark about 
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instrumental music, Snævarr wraps up the whole book with an insipid 
observation that it may all be as in the Bible: There is a time for every-
thing, a time for seeing art as autonomous, a time for seeing it as a tool of 
morals, etc. 
I hope that my reader has understood that Snævarr’s book is full of inter-
esting material, even though it may also contain some annoying aspects. 
For me he gets a high score for his mixture of oral language and percep-
tive presentations and discussions. Then one must bear with the places 
where he just rattles off some standard material he may not even quite 
master himself, or which he does not manage to communicate to anybody, 
especially not to newcomers (e.g. the list of “actants” of Greimas, p. 225). 
And one must bear with the fact that he is not quite precise everywhere. 
This is probably not because he wants his text the way it is – he is, e.g. 
quite keen on mentioning sources and giving references (to both original, 
yet often reprinted, editions and to texts translated into Scandinavian 
languages). I guess it may be because he remembers wrongly as he goes 
along (as one often does in free lectures), or maybe it is because he now 
and then renders his own, somewhat worn, pedagogical version of a point, 
rather than revisiting the original source to see what it would reveal. But 
mostly, he masters his material in a convincing way. I, for one, have the 
special pleasure of seeing that he (contrary to some other Scandinavian 
commentators) has noticed the radical differences between the institu-
tional theory of art that I introduced in my book Æstetiske problemer 
(Problems in Aesthetics) in 1971, and Dickie’s much better known version 
from nearly the same year. 
Here at the end one small reservation (which concerns not only Snæ-
varr’s book, but many other contributions to its field): The text demon-
strates quite clearly that Snævarr both masters and takes delight in the 
philosophy of art. But he presents this field nearly without mentioning 
the scholarly disciplines on the various arts (literary studies, art history, 
musicology etc.), even though they (at least in my view) overlap with aes-
thetics and are much closer connected with the purpose of it all, namely 
making us understand and enjoy actual works of art.
And even more intriguing: does Snævarr take any delight in the arts 
themselves? Google can provide us with the information that he has pub-
lished several volumes of poems in Icelandic, and his text does suggest that 
literary fiction (and probably also music) is closer to his heart than the un-
enthusiastically treated visual arts. (And at least he is very much engaged 
in Old Icelandic writings and several times picks on the Polish-Norwegian 
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cultural studies professor Nina Witoszek for some nonsense that she, in 
his view, has written about the concept of nature in the Edda and the 
Sagas). Somehow his book reveals a strange absence of delight in the visual 
arts and of concrete examples of painting and sculpture, except for some 
trite standard cases like Mona Lisa and Skrik (The Scream) plus what the 
discussed theoreticians have referred to. On the cover of the book we see a 
reproduction of a marvellous painting of a young girl by Ernst Ludwig 
Kirschner, but nothing of the kind plays any role in the text. 
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